



Pirates, Slavers, Brigands, and Gangs: the French 
terminology of anticolonial rebellion (1880-1922) 
 
     Abstract 
During the most rapid period of French colonial expansion (roughly 1880-1914) the French 
faced regular, often violent, resistance to the expansion of their imperial dominion over 
people in Africa and Southeast Asia.  This article examines the changing terminology that 
French soldiers, officers and administrators used to describe the anticolonial movements they 
were called upon to suppress during the course of French conquest and ‘pacification’ 
operations.  This terminology is gleaned both from archival sources, as well as from the so-
called ‘grey literature’ of books, letters and pamphlets published by members of the French 
military, which do not exist in traditional libraries and holdings like the Bibliothèque 
Nationale.  Taken as a whole this analysis grants us insight into how the French thought about 
themselves, their anticolonial opponents, how these conceptions changed over time, and how 
these conceptions translated into action and methodology. 
 
After missionaries, soldiers were often the first Frenchmen to enter the African and Southeast 
Asian interior.  These soldiers (men and officers) at the forefront of French colonial conquest 
left behind extensive source material, which gives us a unique perspective into both the 
actions and mind-set of French colonisers in the late 1800s and early 1900s.  They not only 
wrote official reports1, they maintained correspondence with their relatives and friends2, 
developed stories3, propaganda texts4, and sometimes published novels based on their 
                                                
 
 
1 For example Lieutenant-Colonel Archinard (1891), Rapport officiel sur la campagne de 1890-1891 (Paris: 
Dentu) & Commandant Le Prince (1893), Étude militaire sur le Tonkin (Paris: Baudouin) 
2 For example, Orsat, Félix (1893) Au Soudan (1890-1891), souvenirs d’un tirailleur sénégalais d’après sa 
correspondance intime (Paris: Picard) & Le Commandant Lamy d'après sa correspondance et ses souvenirs de 
campagne (1858-1900) (Paris: Hachette, 1903). See also, D’Andurain , Julie (2015) « La correspondance privée 
des coloniaux » in Bérenger, Agnès et Dard, Olivier (eds., 2015), Gouverner par les lettres, de l’Antiquité à 
l’époque contemporaine, Metz, Centre de recherche Universitaire Lorrain d’Histoire, pp. 95-113. 
3 For example: Lahille, Abel (1910) Mes Impressions sur l'Afrique occidentale française. (Étude documentaire 
au pays du tam-tam), (Paris: A. Picard) 
4 De Lanessan, Jean (1896) L’Expansion coloniale de la France : étude économique, politique et géographique 
sur les établissements français d’outre-mer (Paris: Alcan) 
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experience5.  On occasion they acted as journalists, often with support from the directors, 
publicists, and politicians of the parti colonial in Paris: those military and government men 
who advocated for a vast French overseas empire.6  Taken in its broadest sense, the literature 
produced during the most intensive period of colonial conquest (1880-1914) forms today a 
considerable mass of documents.  In the form of primary sources, secondary sources or ‘grey 
literature’7 we can think of these sources as together constituting a ‘colonial military 
literature’.8  This literature is a valuable and under-utilised resource in determining how the 
French understood the socio-political and military contexts they were operating in.  This is 
especially true of the changing character of armed conflict between the French and local 
populations in Africa and Southeast Asia as initial conquests turned into enduring policing 
operations with a wide variety of political, social and military challenges.  This article will 
examine some of the diverse sources these officers left behind and analyse the evolving 
understanding French military personnel had of the anticolonial movements they were called 
on to police and supress. 
 
 The military men who undertook the initial conquest and ‘pacification’ of the French 
overseas empire quickly came into contact with resistance, often violent, to the nascent 
                                                
 
 
5 For example, Harmant, Jacques (1892) La Vérité sur la retraite de Lang-Son. Mémoires d’un combattant, 
(Paris: Albert Savine) 
6 D’Andurain, Julie (2017) Colonialisme ou impérialisme ? Le ‘parti colonial’ en pensée et en action (Paris: 
Hémisphères éditions/Zellige) 
7 Generally referred to as ‘grey literature’ these are works beyond the usual circuits of production and 
distribution and that are not subject to legal deposit (theses, dissertations, reports, etc.).  They are not referenced 
in the Bibliothèque Nationale.  Some of these monographs are maintained by the French Africa Committee and a 
number of others are military books kept by the French military. 
8 Dodille, Norbert (2011), Introduction aux discours coloniaux (Paris: PUPS).  For a polemic approach of the 
concept of colonial literature, see Krapor, Vladimir ‘Provocation Versus Performativity: Lauching la littérature 
coloniale française in 1909’, Modern & Contemporary France, February 2015, vol. 23, Issue 1, p. 47-64. 
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control they had established.  When writing about resistance these men generally did not refer 
to rebels as the ‘social bandit’ described by Eric Hobsbawn some 60 years ago.9  This is not to 
say that the French did not have a varied and nuanced language to describe the regular 
uprisings they found themselves facing.  Indeed, the French deployed a range of terms to 
describe anticolonial rebels that belie geography, time period, French perceptions of 
individual movements, as well as their own self-perception as colonisers.  French officers 
often chose their terminology self-consciously to frame situations to their superiors in the 
colonial capitals like Dakar and Hanoi, or indeed in Paris, in such a way as to either bolster or 
shield the reputation of the officer in question.  Language could either inflate or downplay the 
actual importance of a given movement in order to prod higher authorities to respond, or at 
least in the worst case to deflect their own possible responsibility for things getting out of 
hand.  The internal and external political context in which French officers wrote about 
anticolonial rebellion was paramount. 
 The French military in this period expressed the idea of ‘rebellion’ in many different 
ways, varying in both time and space.  French military personnel saw their opponents not 
quite as ‘the enemy’ (in the strict military sense), not always as a bandit, rarely as a legitimate 
soldier, and at least in this period, not yet as a nationalist.  In Southeast Asia French officers 
tended to refer to rebels as ‘pirates’, reflecting the actual existence of powerful pirate and 
bandit groups in the region in the 1800s.10  In African colonial literature there was initially no 
                                                
 
 
9 Hobsbawn, Eric (1959) Primitive Rebels (Manchester: University of Manchester Press) 
10 For more on ‘pirates’, the Black Flags and on French activity in Southeast Asia see Finch, Michael P. M. 
(2013), A Progressive Occupation? The Gallieni-Lyautey Method and Colonial Pacification in Tonkin and 
Madagascar, 1885-1900 (Oxford : Oxford University Press) 
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talk of ‘piracy’, but instead of ‘bandits’11, ‘slave-chiefs’ or ‘mahdistes’.12  Similar 
terminology, arising out of similar political and military pressures, was also prevalent in 
British India, among other European overseas colonies.13  Over time, however, in part 
because of the proliferation of anticolonial rebellions and also due to the transference of 
colonial officers between different theatres of operation, the terminology surrounding 
anticolonial rebellions began to unify.  This unification of terminology, to some extent 
representative of a unification of French, and wider European, concepts of imperialism and 
anticolonialism, underscores a growing awareness of the widespread opposition to 
colonization, and the nascent emergence of nationalism in parts of Africa and Asia which has 
roots in the struggle against European imperialism.  For the French, how they wrote and 
talked about rebellion was a critical part of the fight against anticolonialism.  They actively 
sought to improve their ability to fight against anticolonial, and later nationalist, movements 
both in military terms, but also through their speech. 
 
What is a rebel?  
In the nineteenth century, the French use of the word ‘rebel’ designated something of an 
instigator; one who must be compelled to obedience.  By definition, the rebel is one who 
challenges a ruling power.  If political opposition exists within a legal framework, the case 
becomes one of ‘disobedience’.  If an individual resists political authority, does not obey, and 
                                                
 
 
11 De Vilers, Charles Le Myre d, « L’Expédition du Tonkin : La Passé, le Présent, l’Avenir », La Nouvelle revue, 
November-December 1884, p. 700-728; « Nous nous proposions seulement de châtier les bandits connus sous le 
nom de Pavillons Noirs, et nous avons été assez imprudents pour faire la guerre à l’Annam puis à la Chine » 
12 Vasco, Gabriel, « Le Madhisme au Soudan », Revue française de l’étranger et des colonies et Exploration, 
Gazette géographique, Avril 1896, t. XXI, n°208,p. 231-237 , and more generally Pascha, Rudolph Slatin (1896) 
Feuer und Schwert im Sudan (1879-1895) (Leipzig: Brockhaus) 
13 Burton, Major Reginald, ‘Partisans or Bandits’, Royal United Services Institute Journal, July-September 
1897, XVII, issue 128, p. 291-292. 
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violates socio-cultural rules or traditions, they became a ‘dissident’, and so forth.  Such 
naming conventions can take many forms, and should be instantly recognizable as part of the 
basic political framework between the ‘rebel’ and the ‘establishment’.  As Stathis Kalyvas put 
it in his 2006 book The Logic of Violence in Civil War: ‘incumbents…label their opponents 
“bad guys”, bandits, criminals, subversives, or terrorists – and describe the war as banditry, 
terrorism, delinquent subversion, and other cognate terms’.14  Kalyvas counts anticolonial 
wars as civil wars, and does so for good reason: typically members of the local ethnic 
populations do the vast bulk of the fighting and dying, with allegiances very often falling 
along pre-colonial lines, or other factors that have little or nothing to do with the presence of 
an outside power.15   
 In the French colonial context of the late 19th and early 20th centuries organised 
anticolonial violence could be emblematic of a broader popular resistance that might lead to a 
full-blown insurrection, or it may constitute merely the armed resistance of scattered gangs 
without any real political objectives beyond survival.  The French generally distinguished 
between these different types of resistance by referring to them as either ‘political’ or 
‘apolitical’, albeit often without solid evidence for their classifications.16  This classification 
could be used to make movements seem more or less threatening, as the reporter may desire, 
and also had ramifications for what could be done to captured dissidents.  There were at times 
hotly contested debates over whether actions were ‘political’ or not in court, and also whether 
                                                
 
 
14 Kalyvas, Stathis (2006) The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 17 
15 Ibid., p. 19 
16 Such judgements often relied on the gut feeling of administrators.  One example, of many: Archives 
Nationales d’Outre Mer (ANOM), Fonds Ministériels, nouveau fonds, carton 28 (dossiers 1-6) « Extrait du 
Rapport sur la situation politique de la Cochinchine pendant le 2ème trimestre 1915 » 
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or not Metropolitan law applied to colonial subjects.17   
 The prevailing terminology for referring to ‘rebels’ or ‘rebellion’ often related to 
historical or geographic markers that make the varied regions under French influence different 
from each other.  In Asia French terminology was influenced by the British definitions given 
to the gunmen of India and Burma, the dacoit18; dacoïtisme having prospered amid weak 
Brahman institutions. 19  In Annam bandits spread through the support of mandarins hostile to 
France, many of them supported discretely by China, in a perennial anarchic system which the 
French chose to call piracy.20  Of these the Black Flags are undoubtedly the most well-known, 
although transnational connections between China and Southeast Asia were a common 
concern throughout the French imperial period (the revolution of Sun Yat-Sen, for example, 
and other disturbances in China often had significant implications for life in northern 
Indochina).21  
 Interestingly, the term ‘pirate’ was not only used by Europeans in Southeast Asia.  It 
was also used by some Vietnamese leaders who refused to accept the French occupation, as 
evidenced by the papers of Ngé-Dinh, an Annamite chieftain in the region of Than-Hoa and 
                                                
 
 
17 ANOM; FM, nf 28 (1-6); « Rapport sur l’affaire des nommés Nguyen Anh Hu et Consorts, 
dite affaire de Baria »; 14 Nov 1916  
18 The term dacoit (used in English and French) refers to highway bandits in India and elsewhere in Asia from 
the mid-nineteenth century onwards. They are also called ‘drivers’, ‘thieves’, ‘robbers’ at different times and 
places. They are characterized essentially by their mobility. 
19 Sahita, Hussain Imddad & alii, ‘Dacoity is an Organized Crime: A Case Study of Sindh Province’, Pakistan 
Journal of Social Sciences, December 2009, vol. 29, No. 2, p. 301-312. Cited by Harmand, Jules (1887) L'Indo-
Chine française, politique et administration. Conférence faite à l'Association républicaine du centenaire de 1789 
(Paris: Pariset) 
20 Le Prince, Étude militaire sur le Tonkin, op.cit. 
21 Goscha, Christopher E., ‘Building Force: Asian origins of twentieth-century military science in Vietnam 
(1905-1954)’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Oct., 2003), p. 539 
Page 6 of 61
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/french
































































Nge-An between 1886 and 1887.22  In his text, he wrote that local people considered the 
French to be pirates for the way they had subjugated and exploited Indochina.  This language 
is repeated by other Vietnamese individuals at different times.  The concept of French piracy 
played a prominent role in the decrees released by rebels in Thai-Nguyen in 1917, one of the 
first uprisings in Indochina to position itself in clearly nationalist terms.23   
 Soon, other words became associated with the ‘rebel’ and ‘pirate’.  ‘Gang’ became 
synonymous with irregular forces, sometimes even with local militias.  All this reflects the 
emergence of an unknown war, irregular warfare, but also of French efforts to control, or at 
least influence, the political messaging of internal dissent.24  
 
‘Enemy’ or ‘rebel’? 
Why did the French not simply refer to rebels as ‘the enemy’, the way they would have 
referred to most military opponents?  Largely, this was due to the delicate political 
circumstances in which the French armed forces were operating. To label rebel forces as ‘the 
enemy’ implies certain political preconditions, and strongly suggests the legitimacy of their 
movement (this is the point Kalyvas made in The Logic of Violence in Civil War).  From a 
purely military perspective, talking about ‘the enemy’ also suggests, and perhaps opens the 
door to more conventional forms of warfare.25  The term ‘enemy’ could furthermore be 
politically inflexible.  This could be a serious hindrance in the fluid strategic environment the 
                                                
 
 
22 Dinh, Ngé (1890) Une Année de la guerre en Annam, 1886-87, racontée par un chef de rebelle, publié par la 
Revue du cercle militaire 
23 ANOM, FM, nf, carton 58, dossier 646; « Annexe No 4 à la lettre No du Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à 
Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies ; Le 15 du 7e mois de la Ière année de DAI-HUNG-DE-QUOC » 
24 MacCaulay, G M., ‘Irregular Troops’, RUSI Journal, 1862, volume V, Issue 20, pp. 637-643. 
25 Un colon, « L’insurrection de Ky-Dong » , Questions diplomatiques et colonials, 15 février 1898, pp. 240-242  
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French found themselves in, in which today’s enemies may need to be accommodated with 
tomorrow (the granting of a small, semi-independent fiefdom to the bandit king De Tham is a 
case in point).  Keenly aware of the disadvantages that would come with legitimizing their 
opponents, French officers tended to shy away from strictly military language, and instead 
adopted more the more vague terminology of policing and security. 
 During the conquest of the bulk of its colonial empire, the French had no official 
declared enemy.  They instead faced a complicated, messy situation that included everything 
from massacres, and robbery, to simple brigandage and even full-blown insurrection.  The 
concept of a rebel (pirate, bandit, etc.) was often used as a euphemism for any opponent 
operating within a non-state framework.  In principle, its vocabulary should be more a matter 
of debate on the maintenance of order and security, but in the colonial context, it always 
confuses ‘war’ with ‘security’ and ‘policing’.  Indeed, the French, both civilian and military, 
often referred to their own military operations as ‘police actions’ when fighting against 
anticolonial forces, rather than ‘military operations’, a term usually reserved for more remote 
geographies, or more extreme levels of opposition (such as in Niger and Chad in the early 20th 
century).26  The conduct of this sort of fighting does not typically fit the traditional 
‘Clausewitzian’ model, but rather  took the form of the ‘small war’27, that is to say, the war of 
ambush and surprise which began to be codified in the mid-nineteenth century, adding to the 
development of an agreed upon language for anticolonial uprisings.28  
 
                                                
 
 
26 Jeffries, Charles (1952) The Colonial Police (London: Max Parrish) 
27 De Decker, Ch.  (1845) De la Petite guerre selon l'esprit de la stratégie moderne (Paris: Corréard) & later, 
Callwell, Charles (1896) Small wars : Their Principles and Practice (London: HMSO) 
28 Quinteau, A. (1884) La Guerre de surprise et d’embuscades (Paris: Lavauzelle) 
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The rebel group, an army? 
The transition from simple brigandage to rebellion was often expressed by use of the word 
‘surpris’ (uprising) by French officers; a word that strongly implied a certain magnitude of 
opposition. 29  It was a much stronger word than the ubiquitous ‘troubles’, which typically 
included riots, bombings, skirmishes and assassination.  The uprising in Than Hoa, in 
northern Tonkin, in 1886 or the Bambara and Fulani in Segou in 1892 were sufficiently large 
to outstrip the term ‘troubles’ and grow into full-blown ‘uprisings’ in French parlance. This 
more serious level of discontent (‘uprising’) was considered especially dangerous if it was 
backed by a religious movement, especially one associated with Islam.30   
 French officers soon learned to distinguish between the pirate, the rebel, the band, the 
‘gang’ and full-blown rebellious armies. In general, groups were first identified by their 
leader (for example, Tu Duc or Vinc-Phuoc, both leaders of the Black-flags, or Doi-Van and 
De Tham in the Yen-Thé region in Tonkin; Lat-Dior, Behanzin, Samory, and Ahmadou were 
similarly classified in Africa). The French often knew the rough location of these groups, 
except in cases where the rebels were mobile or nomadic, but at times knew little more than 
that.  In the absence of clear intelligence, the identification of the leader at times acted as a 
shortcut to describing not just the socio-political motives of a given anticolonial group, but 
                                                
 
 
29 Colonel Viotte, « De la surprise », Revue militaire française, septembre 1922, t. 5, p. 347-366.  Delmas, Jean, 
« La surprise », Direction des études d’histoire, cours supérieur d’histoire, École Supérieur de Guerre, Novembre 
1973. 
30 Monteil, Vincent, « Lat Dior, Damel du Kayor, (1842-1886) et l'islamisation des Wolofs », Archives de 
sociologie des religions, juillet-décembre 1963, 8e année, n°16, p. 77-104. See also Marty, Paul (1920) Études 
sur l’Islam et les tribus du Soudan (Paris: Leroux).  For North Africa, see Burke III, Edmund, ‘Pan-Islam and 
Moroccan resistance to French Colonial Penetration, 1900-12’, The Journal of African History, January 1972, 
vol. 13, Issue 1, p. 97-118. 
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also their assumed tactics.31   
 Given this spotty intelligence, estimates on rebel troop numbers could vary wildly. In 
Asia, the French rarely had good intelligence on the number of Black Flags there were, but 
nevertheless considered it necessary to mobilize at least 20,000 to 30,000 men against them 
between 1883-1886.32  For comparison, the Siamese army was estimated to be only 5,000 
men in 1893.33  In Africa estimates also varied wildly.  Officers believed that Ahmadou, ‘the 
Jugurtha of Sudan’, was able to muster 10,000 warriors against Archinard in December 
1890.34  While unlikely, such large forces were not unknown to the region.  The Abyssinians 
were able bring 30,000 men against the Italians; the Dahomey army has nearly 22,000 men; 
the Malagasy maintained a force of 25,000 to 30,000 warriors. 35  Samory force numbers were 
roughly the same (between 20,000 and 30,000).36  So these are real armies with regular 
regimented soldiers, and as such their members were often given specific names: the 
‘Amazons’ of Behanzin in Dahomey37, the ‘talibés’ of Ahmadou, the ‘sofas’ of Samory.38  In 
the absence of more complete intelligence the sheer size of these forces was used to intuit 
                                                
 
 
31 Commandant Verraux, « Monographie d’un chef pirate au Tonkin : le De-Tham », À travers le monde, 16 et 
23 juillet 1898, p. 225-228 et 233-236. 
32 Le Prince, Étude militaire sur le Tonkin, op.cit. 
33 « Nouvelles géographiques et coloniales », Revue française de l’étranger et des colonies et Exploration, 
Gazette géographique, Juillet, 1893, tome XVIII, n° 169, p. 37-45 
34 Valbert, « Le Sultan Ahmadou et la Campagne du colonel Archinard dans le Soudan français », Revue des 
Deux Mondes, 1er décembre 1890, tome CII, p. 673-686. 
35 Bayol, Jean (1893) Les Dahoméens au Champ de Mars (Palais des Arts libéraux) : moeurs et coutumes : 
exposition d'ethnographie coloniale (Paris: Herment) 
36 Legassick, Martin, ‘Firearms, Horses and Samorian Army Organisation, 1870-1898’, Journal of African 
History, 1966, vol. 7, No. 1, p. 95-115. 
37 Topor, Hélène d’Almeida (1984) Les Amazones. Une armée de femmes dans l’Afrique précoloniale (Paris: 
Rochevigne/ editions de la lanterne magique) 
38 Sow, Alioune ‘Biography and Colonial Discourse in ‘French West Africa’’, Social Dynamics. A journal of 
African studies, 2004, vol. 30, Issue 1, p. 69-93. 
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their intentions and preferred modes and methodology. 
 Rebel groups of this size were immediately considered dangerous by the French.  
Their size gave them power to persist, even after losing an engagement, to replace losses with 
new recruits, and to pin down European forces which would otherwise have moved on to 
other trouble areas.39  Being pinned down severely slowed the advance of European empires, 
something that was to be avoided at all costs in the mad dash to carve up Africa in the late 
1800s.  This being the case, negotiation and co-option remained the easiest way to keep 
moving forward in all territories, especially in Africa where local leaders - Damel, Brach, 
Bour, Massa, Almamy, Naba - often had to give their consent before French forces could pass 
through their domains.40  This consent often came with a price in kind, or in gold.  Once paid, 
European forces could benefit from the protection of the tribe, the Anaiah.41   
 By comparison, in East Africa the Germans typically ensure their safety by producing 
a letter of recommendation from the Sultan in Istanbul.42  Such appeals to authority were 
common practice among Europeans operating in Africa.  In the late 1880s Gallieni and 
Captain Binger helped ensure their security in Sudan by circulating letters written on their 
behalf by the Toucouleur chief Ahmadou, son of the erstwhile anticolonial leader, El Hadj 
Omar. 43  This was a bold proposal considering the fact that El Hadj and the Toucouleur had 
conducted a major war against the French 20 years earlier.  This practice of seeking out and 
disseminating letters from important religious or indigenous authority figures persisted with 
                                                
 
 
39 Pietri, Capitaine Camille (1885) Les Français au Niger : voyages et combats (Paris: Hachette) 
40 Beucher, Benoît (2017) Manger le pouvoir au Burkina Faso. La noblesse mossi à l'épreuve de l'Histoire 
(Paris : Karthala) 
41 De Foucauld, Charles (1888)  Reconnaissance du Maroc, 1883-1884 (Paris: Challamel) 
42 “Germany  and East Africa”, The Times, December 1888, 28th, p. 3 
43 Binger, Capitaine Louis-Gustave (1892) Du Niger au golfe de Guinée par le pays de Kong et le Mossi (1887-
1889) (Paris: Hachette) 
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varying levels of success.44  It was seen as especially useful in dealing with areas that were on 
the extreme fringes of French influence, and which could not be kept pacified through the 
installation of sizeable permanent garrisons. 
   
Places and modes of rebel action  
Not every jurisdiction was conducive to the development of rebellion.  Proximity to French 
administrative and military power generally precluded the organisation of large-scale violent 
resistance.  Uprisings more often began in more remote and rugged regions where groups 
could operate with relative impunity.  Laurent Henninger has referred to these different 
geographies as the ‘fluid’ and the ‘solid’.45  Lyautey, for example, remarked that ‘the pirate is 
a plant that grows only in certain lands’.46  Geography had an impact on how the French 
understood, and responded to, anticolonial movements.  To an extent, the nature of French 
forces themselves also influenced the terminology used.  Thus, we find marines more likely to 
refer to ‘pirates’ in the Asian littoral, and ‘rebels’ being referred to by the army fighting in the 
African interior.  There were also distinctions made between pacified and war torn territories, 
which were usually called ‘military territories’ and administered directly by the French armed 
forces. This division between civilian and militarily governed areas was one determined by 
the French, but it was not entirely inconsistent with pre-existing realities. In the Arab world, 
for example, especially in Morocco, there was a similar distinction between the bled es-
                                                
 
 
44 ANOM 14 MIOM 1084 19G1, bobbin 445; « Situation islamique dans le Haut-Sénégal-Niger »; Afrique 
Occidentale et Afrique Equatoriale, Affaires musulmanes, Dakar, 7 Mars 1915  
45 Henninger, Laurent, « Espaces fluides et espaces solides : nouvelle réalité stratégique ? », Revue Défense 
nationale, octobre 2012, n°753, p. 5-9. 
46 Lyautey, Hubert (1920) Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar (1894-1899), Tome 1, août 1896 (Paris: Armand 
Colin); « Le pirate est une plante qui ne pousse que dans certaines terres » 
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Maghzen, land under the authority of the Sultan, and the bled es-siba, areas of only tenuous 
influence and control.47 
 The codification of ‘rebel’ terminology amongst French officers and administrators 
had not only a geographic spread, but also a temporal chronology.  It began with the French 
codification of ‘piracy’ in Southeast Asia from 1875-1880, and was soon followed by the 
realization that similar patterns of unrest existed in Africa from 1882-1885.  Joseph Gallieni 
was one of the first to speak of African leaders as rebels to the French authority.48  This 
evolution marked a notable change in how the French saw their actions in Africa and 
Southeast Asia.  On the one hand the French recognised the rights of existing states (like the 
still-young Toucouleur empire) to exercise sovereignty and to sign treaties with other 
independent political entities (be they the French, or others).  On the other, however, many of 
these states were (conveniently) considered decadent by the French, leading them to consider 
such territories res nullius49 or ‘nobody’s property’: thus, free territories to occupy.  Such a 
conception led to French forces almost casually claiming lands and territories, which of 
course led promptly to the emergence and maintenance of violent resistance against their 
claims of domination.   
 From the 1880s, the French officers came to understand that they were facing a global 
phenomenon.  Before trying to craft any sort of broader framework for understanding and 
responding to outbursts of anticolonial violence they began by thinking about the specificities 
of each theatre, and studying patterns of specific actions.  These would then be collated 
                                                
 
 
47 Burke III, Edmund (1976) Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco. Precolonial protest and resistance, 1860-1912 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 
48 Gallieni, Joseph (1885) Voyage au Soudan français (Haut-Niger et pays de Ségou), 1879-1881, publication de 
la mission d’exploration du Haut-Niger (Paris: Hachette) 
49 Salomon, Charles (1889) L’Occupation des territoires sans maîtres (Paris: Girard) 
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together, compared and contrasted with the intention of finding more generally applicable 
solutions to the problems posed by persistent anticolonial conflicts.  A comparison of the 
geographical and contextual differences between Southeast Asia and West Africa will help 
illustrate this point. 
 
Tonkinese dens 
 The fighting in Tonkin took on a character that belied simple classification, and sat 
outside the prevailing French discourse surrounding anticolonial rebellion.  The first military 
texts to discuss and attempt to classify the fighting in Tonkin date back to 1885.50  The war 
circulated around the discovery and destruction of ‘rebel dens’ (the ‘den’ of Tong-Hoa Phu 
was destroyed in November 1894, and that of Phiama in December 1894 by Théophile 
Pennequin, for example).51  Following the destruction of each ‘den’ the French erected their 
own outpost in the region to assert their control and influence over the area.52  Many of these 
‘rebel dens’ existed in areas like Yen-Thé, a region made famous by the long rule of De 
Tham, the bandit king.   
 Yen-Thé had an ideal geography in which to base a rebellious or insurrectional 
movement.  Upper Tonkin is a mountainous area, filled with dense forest: a difficult ‘Swiss 
Tonkinese’.53  The area lent itself to the construction of complex fortifications, which the 
                                                
 
 
50 C*** P. A., « La guerre au Tonkin  », Journal des Sciences militaires, mars 1885, tome 17, p. 420-437. 
51 Munholland, John Kim, ‘“Collaboration Strategy” and the French Pacification of Tonkin, 1885-1897’, The 
Historical Journal, September 1981, vol. 24, No. 3, p. 629-650. 
52 Lieutenant-Colonel Durand, « La vie d'un poste militaire dans la haute région du Tonkin », Revue des Troupes 
Coloniales, 1925 (4 articles). 
53 L. Girod (1899) Dix Ans de Haut-Tonkin (Tours : Mame et Fils) 
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French could not easily break without massing substantial firepower.54  Such an 
organisational effort generally was sufficient to tip off an impending attack, giving De Tham 
and his band of ‘pirates’ ample time to flee into the densely wooded mountains, or slip over 
the border into a neighbouring province.  Similar areas, be they jungle, mountain or desert, 
existed across the French empire and were generally far beyond the reach of meaningful 
European control.  Such terrain had a magnetic quality that drew a wide range of dissidents to 
it, strengthening existing rebel/outlaw bands.55  For both French and British colonial officers 
these spaces were understood and referred to as the ‘hinterland’.56   
 On occasions when the French were able to locate and penetrate a ‘rebel den’, they 
were consistently impressed by the ‘pirate’ defence systems; their organization was often 
markedly better than fortifications built by the French.57  Dens were generally in the middle of 
a dense forest hidden by underbrush with camouflaged firing positions producing overlapping 
fields of fire protecting the den’s few exits and entrances.58  Alongside such defences rebels 
and outlaws in Southeast Asia made use of an array of field defences which would go on to 
develop lasting notoriety during the Vietnam War: ‘punji sticks’ (shallow excavations 
                                                
 
 
54 ANOM nf 49, dossier 597, « Note sur les opérations de police dans la région du Yênthé »; in this particular 
example from 1909 the French managed to launch a surprise assault on one of De Tham’s ‘dens’ by relying on 
friendly Tonkinese volunteers as the bulk of their force.  Nevertheless De Tham escaped, albeit wounded, and 
many of his followers were killed or captured.  De Tham would not be caught until 1913 when he was betrayed 
by one of his pirates after some 20 years of living outside the law in Yen Thé. 
55 ANOM, INDO, nf 49, dossier 597,  « Annexe No. 1 : Texte de la proclamation adressée par M. Morel, 
Résident Supérieur au Tonkin aux populations de la province de Bac-Giang ».  The same is true for Saharan 
oases, and the mountains of the Maghreb. McDougall, James (2017)  History of Algeria (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), p. 254 (forthcoming) 
56 Lees, Elliott, “The Doctrine Of ‘Hinterland’", The Times, August 1890, 15th ; “The Franco-German Treaty and 
the "Hinterland" of Cameroons”, The Geographical Journal, May 1894, vol. 3, issue 5, p. 414-415  ; see also 
d’Andurain, Julie (2012) La Capture de Samory (1898). L’achèvement de la conquête de l’Afrique de l’Ouest 
(Saint-Cloud: Soteca) pp. 115-122. 
57 Mat-Goï (1891) Le Tonkin actuel, 1887-1890 (Paris: Albert Savine) 
58 ANOM, INDO, nf 49, dossier 597, « Note sur les opérations de police dans la région du Yênthé »; De Tham’s 
primary base was especially daunting in this regard. 
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staggered with a large sharp stake driven deep in every hole), fences and bamboo stakes often 
masked their fortified hideouts. 
 Even if the French could locate and clear out a ‘rebel den’ that was often not enough.  
The ‘pirates’ often escaped French efforts to capture them and break up their ring.  They were 
aided in this by the seasonal nature of the struggle, with wet seasons limiting the size and 
duration of French operations.  Weather often made the remote, mountainous regions 
unnavigable for French forces, and even in good weather the French could not always scrape 
together the funds necessary to create and sustain a column in the field for long enough to 
track down rebel bands.59  In an attempt to get around these substantial operational difficulties 
the French relied heavily on what little intelligence they could gather.  When good 
intelligence came in it was necessary to act quickly, which spurred the rapid installation of 
optical telegraphy in Indochina to facilitate rapid communication from military post to 
military post.60  This gave the French an advantage, but it also meant that the telegraph wires 
were an obvious and frequent target for anticolonial rebels.61   
 Over time the French also began to use the language of policing and inherent authority 
in Southeast Asia.  Regarding one attempt to capture De Tham in 1909 the French resident of 
Tonkin released a public decree stating that: 
 
‘The French Government has granted Hoàng-hoa-Tham [De Tham] for some years [an offer] 
to submit, on the condition that he would in future be an honest man.  Since this time this 
                                                
 
 
59 Gallieni, Joseph-Simon (1899) Trois colonnes au Tonkin (1894-1895) (Paris: Chapelot) 
60 Lieutenant Saillard, « La télégraphie optique. Son rôle au Tonkin, son avenir », Journal des Sciences 
militaires, octobre 1886, tome 32, p. 96-116. 
61 ANOM, ALG, CONST, B3 219; « Les Troubles Insurrectionnels de l’Arrondissement de Batna en 1916 » 
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pirate chief has constantly failed to keep his word.  His concession [De Tham had been 
granted a small fiefdom by the French in return for keeping his brigandage under control] has 
become the refuge of poisoners, thieves, assassins and brigands.  The Government, of which 
all the honest population knows its sentiments, tired of the odious conduct of this bandit chief 
has decided: [in order] to support the working population, and assure them tranquillity, to put 
an end to the current situation in Yen-Thé and place the region under the common rule…. The 
Government is firmly resolved to go to the end.  All is ready.  [The Government] will 
compensate all those who help it.  Deliver up De Tham, who has violated all laws.’62 
 
 
By the early 1900s the French were no longer an invading force in Southeast Asia, or there 
under thin pretences to help the Nguyen Dynasty’s legal government.  Instead, they had 
become the government, and spoke as such; a major marker in French colonial supremacy in 
the region.  At this time the French began more and more to refer to rebels as ‘insoumis’: 
those who have not (yet) submitted.63  Such language not only positioned the French as the 
legitimate authority, but also assumed the inevitability of their colonial dominance (itself a 
                                                
 
 
62 ANOM, INDO, nf 49, dossier 597, « Annexe No. 1 : Texte de la proclamation adressée par M. Morel, 
Résident Supérieur au Tonkin aux populations de la province de Bac-Giang » ; « Le Gouvernement Français 
avait accordé à Hoàng-hoa-Tham, il y a quelques années, de faire sa soumission, sous la réserve qu’il serait à 
l’avenir un honnête homme.  Depuis cette époque, ce Chef pirate a manqué constamment à sa parole.  Sa 
concession est devenue le refuge des empoisonneurs, des voleurs, des assassins, des brigands.  Le Gouvernement 
dont toute la population honnête connaît les généreux sentiments, fatigué de la conduite odieuse de ce chef 
bandit, se décidé ; afin de soutenir la population travailleuse, et lui assurer la tranquillité, de mettre fin la 
situation actuelle du Yênthé et de placer cette région sous le régime commun… Le Gouvernement est fermement 
résolu à aller jusqu’au bout.  Tout est prêt.  Il récompensera tous ceux qui l’aideront.  Livrez-lui le Dè-Tham qui 
a violé toutes lois. »  
63 ANOM, ALG, CONST, B3 219; « Les Troubles Insurrectionnels de l’Arrondissement de Batna en 1916 » 
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term that French officers used self-consciously).64 
 
African « tata » 
 Similar patterns existed in Africa, with the French changing their language as they 
faced resistance to their imperial ambitions in the African interior.  The enduring popular 
image of this period remains one of vast numbers of brave, but poorly armed, African 
warriors throwing themselves hopelessly against the full weight of modern firepower brought 
to bear by Europeans and their local allies.  In reality, however, the French very quickly found 
themselves fighting against forces that relied heavily on firearms, and even modern, quick-
firing rifles. This is certainly the case in Dahomey with Behanzin65, Ahmadou near Segou on 
the Niger66, Samory in French Sudan67, as well as with Rabih az-Zubayr ibn Fadl Allah and 
al-Zubayr between the basins of the Nile and the Ubangi.68  This is especially true once the 
First World War begins and African warrio s found themselves with better access to 
European weaponry than ever before.  This was in part due to Turco-German efforts to stoke 
anticolonial unrest in French and British colonies, but also the ample opportunities for 
capturing, stealing or being given European weapons sent to Africa during the conflict.69   
                                                
 
 
64 French references to their own ‘domination’ are rife in their colonial writings.  Just one example here from 
Niger, 1917: ANOM, 14 MIOM 303, 1D216, bobbin 69; « Rapport d’Operations – Causes qui ont nécessité la 
Colonne » 
65 Aublet, Edouard )1894) La Guerre au Dahomey, 1888-1893, d’après les documents officiels (Paris : Berger-
Levrault) 
66 See Pietri, Camille (1885) Les Français au Niger : voyages et combats (Paris: Hachette) & Robinson, David 
(1985) The Holy War of Umar Tal. The Western Sudan in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press) 
67 Samori or Samory. Person, Yves (1968) Samori, une révolution dyula (Dakar: IFAN) 
68 Dujarric, Gaston (1902) La vie du sultan Rabah : les Français au Tchad (Paris : J. André) 
69 For more on this see: Correale, Francesco (2014), La Grande Guerre des trafiquants: Le front colonial de 
l’Occident maghrébin (Paris: l’Harmattan) 
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 Perhaps the most stunning example of anticolonial rebels wielding modern firearms in 
Africa comes from the so-called ‘Kaocen War’ in Niger, 1916-1922.70  The conflict began in 
December 1916 when a mixture of Arab, Toubou and Tuareg warriors appeared outside the 
walls of Agadez in central Niger armed with modern Italian rifles, a machinegun and even an 
70mm Italian artillery piece, with ammunition.71  The warriors themselves were no strangers 
to modern warfare, and included men who had seen action in Algeria at Djanet against the 
French, as well as Italian askari who had deserted in Fez and Tripolitania.72  Such hard 
opponents were not rare in French Africa.  In fact, it was common for French soldiers and 
administrators to refer to nomadic raiding parties (rezzous or harkas) by the number of rifles 
they had rather than their total number of participants, the same way European forces were 
frequently counted in the same period.73 
 Siege operations fuelled by modern, industrial firepower may seem surprising in the 
context of Sub-Saharan African warfare in this period, but in reality French operations in 
West Africa regularly consisted of siege operations against hardy African fortifications.74  
These fortifications were, needless to say, starkly different from those French forces 
encountered in Southeast Asia.  Due to pre-existing patterns of warfare in West Africa 
fortified villages - also called tata75 - covered the entire Upper Niger region from the Bambara 
                                                
 
 
70 This conflict was actually part of a much larger Senussi uprising which saw fighting in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria 
and Niger. 
71 Idrissa, Kimba, The Kawousan War Reconsidered, p. 203 in Abbink, Jon, de Bruijn, Mirjam & Van Walraven, 
Klaas (2003) Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History (Leiden & Boston: Brill) 
72 Ibid. 
73 ANOM, 14 MIOM 862, 11G16, bobbin 222; « Copie de Télégramme Officiel; Territoire Niger à Gouverneur 
Général; Zinder, 13 Octobre 1916 » & « M. Lutaud, Gouverneur Général de l’Algérie à M. Briand, Président du 
Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères »; Alger, 17 Juillet 1916 among many other examples. 
74 Royer, Patrick & Saul, Mahir (2001) West African Challenge to Empire: Culture and History in the Volta-
Bani Anticolonial War (Oxford: James Currey Ltd) p. 162 
75 Gallieni, Joseph (1885) Voyage au Soudan français (Haut-Niger et pays de Ségou), 1879-1881(Paris: 
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country to the right bank of the Niger.  The outer walls of these village fortifications were 
made of mud-cement (a mixture of clay and straw which formed sun-dried bricks), and could 
be several metres high and thick (as at Sikasso in Mali).76  External defences were built to 
facilitate flanking fire, while inside the fortifications there normally existed a smaller 
stronghold used to store men, weapons, ammunition and precious black.  These structures, 
built in the middle of large villages, could often accommodate several thousand people.  Such 
fortresses were sufficiently daunting that they had traditionally been taken by surprise, either 
by scaling or breaching the walls, with assaults made to the sound of tabalas.77   
 Despite such varied regional differences, the French quickly learned to implement a 
series of ‘standard’ measures against insurrections, thus giving rise to a specifically French 
colonial school of thought.  The main feature of this school of thought centred on the 
importance of ensuring the control of communications.78  Instead of a policy of having French 
columns forever chasing faster-moving enemy forces a more steady, concentric method was 
preferred, and remained the hallmark of  uniquely French approach to ‘pacification’. 
 
Countering Rebellion: the Creation of ‘military areas’  
Beyond the French understanding of their opponents and themselves in a colonial context the 
colonial military literature tells us how the French felt they should go about actually 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
Hachette) & Person, Yves, Samori, op.cit., p. 1002.  See also Bah, Thierno Mouctar (2012) Architecture 
militaire traditionnelle en Afrique de l’Ouest, du XVIIe à la fin du XIXe siècle (Paris: L’Harmattan 
76 Sikasso was long the undisputed model of African tata, having an outer-wall whose base was 6 metres wide, 
and 4 to 6 metres deep. Person, Yves, Samori, op.cit., p. 945. 
77 African drums, used for war. 
78 In February 1904 in the circle of Upper Chari, interruption to porting because of a rebel band (M'Brans in the 
Ombella Valley) was seen to justify repression.  Letter of the commander of the circle Chari to Lieutenant-
Colonel Gouraud, 23 février 1904, n°595, ministère des Affaires étrangères (Foreign Ministry), La Courneuve, 
fonds Gouraud, PA AP 399, C14. 
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countering a rebellion once it occurred.  In general, the French responded to prolonged unrest 
with a mixture of cartography, ethnography and building works.79  The initial infrastructural 
work was primarily done between 1883 and 1890.  It occurred in two steps.  The first was an 
adaptation of the old method of building staging posts.  These were generally every 25 
kilometres in Tonkin,80 while in Africa the distance between posts varied widely (reaching up 
to 200 km between certain posts along the Niger River).  Post garrisons could be from 30 to 
100 men who were supplied by regular mule trains, and kept in contact with other posts via 
telegraph. 81  All told, this network eventually formed a more-or-less contiguous line of 
bunkers demarcating areas French control.  The second phase included the formal designation 
of ‘military areas’, a practice which has its intellectual roots in classic studies of Roman 
Africa. 82  This echo of the classical world was brought back due to the intellectual efforts of 
Frenchmen like Jean-Louis de Lanessan (civil-military governor of Indochina, 1891-1894) in 
his Principes de colonisation, published in 1897.83  There was also intellectual cross-
fertilization with the British and struggle against dacoïtisme which saw the suppression of 
civil services and their replacement by a military police.84  
 This principle was applied in Tonkin in April 1891 with the creation of four military 
                                                
 
 
79 D’Andurain, Julie « Cartographie, ethnographie, renseignement, essai de typologie d’une science militaire en 
situation coloniale (1880-1920) » (« Cartography, ethnography, information, typology of military science in a 
colonial situation »), Les Administrations coloniales, contributions aux séminaires 2009-2010 de l’IHTP, janvier 
2010, p. 50-60, on line  http://www.ihtp.cnrs.fr/sites/ihtp/IMG/pdf/Contributions_au_prog-_Ad-_col-_2009-
2010.pdf  
80 This principle was invented by Colonel Pennequin and Gallieni in Tonkin.  Lyautey, Hubert (1920) Lettres du 
Tonkin et de Madagascar (1894-1899), Tome 2 (Paris: Armand Colin), lettre du 21 août 1896 
81 The principle is based on the method of Bugeaud in Algeria and the Arab offices. See Foucher, Victor (1858) 
Les Bureaux arabes en Algérie, Paris, Librairie internationale de l’agriculture et de la colonisation 
82 Boissier, Gaston (1895) L’Afrique romaine, promenades archéologiques en Algérie et Tunisie (Paris : 
Hachette) 
83 De Lanessan, Jean-Louis (1897) Principes de colonisation (Paris: Félix Alcan) 
84 Smith, Vincent (1914) Early History of India (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
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territories, which were seen as borders delineating separate war zones. 85  They were 
commanded by lieutenant-colonels or colonels who had the powers of a general, and thus 
acted as true autocrats in their territories.  The map was further divided into cutting circles 
and sectors in which act the intelligence units. Combined, these overlapping spaces were 
intended to limit the spread of any insurrection, and contain them long enough to be met with 
a suitable repression.  By 1895, the term ‘tache d’huile’ was being used to describe this 
‘progressive’ methodology, generally associated with Joseph Gallieni.86  The theory was 
substantially furthered in Madagascar by Captain Frederic Hellot in 1899. 87 
 
Identification and Submission 
Once the contours of the territories were defined it then became necessary to begin learning 
about the populations contained within, in an attempt to discern who might be favourable to 
the French, and who were likely to be less favourable.88  In order to facilitate what was often a 
crude analysis, officers of the intelligence service began their own research, including 
ethnographic studies (albeit of wildly varying quality).89  Such studies were frequently 
conducted by colonial administrators or officers who saw themselves as there to help lift up 
                                                
 
 
85 De Grandmaison, Louis (1898) En territoire militaire : l’expansion française au Tonkin (Paris: Plon-Nourrit) 
86 Lyautey, Hubert (1920) Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar (1894-1899), Tome 1 (Paris: Armand Colin), 
Lettre de Lyautey à son frère le 5 février 1895.  For more on this and on Madagascar see Finch, Michael P. M. 
(2013), A Progressive Occupation? The Gallieni-Lyautey Method and Colonial Pacification in Tonkin and 
Madagascar, 1885-1900 (Oxford : Oxford University Press) 
87 Hellot, Frédéric, « La Pacification de Madagascar », Journal des Sciences militaires, octobre 1899, p. 5-56. 
88 Samya El Mechat (2009, ed.), Les administrations coloniales XIXe-XXe siècles. Esquisse d’une histoire 
comparée, (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes) & El Mechat, Samya (2014, ed.), Coloniser, pacifier, 
administrer (CNRS Editions) 
89 Capitaine du Crosson (1901) L’ethnographie de la Côte d’Ivoire (Paris: Comité de l’Afrique française) & 
Commandant Lunet de la Jonquières (1904) Ethnographie des territoires militaires (Hanoï: Schneider), publié 
ensuite sous le titre Ethnographie du Tonkin septentrional (Paris: Leroux, 1906) 
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colonised populations through French intervention into African and Asian societies and 
economies.  While the overall use of such frameworks was largely a simple matter of ex post 
facto justification, the better ethnographies were produced by individuals who did genuinely 
see themselves, and their goals, in this light.  Such self-conceptions often had tangible effects 
on how individuals chose to operate in their overseas duties.   
 Broad intelligence work, including early ethnographies, led to the identification of 
three basic types of rebel bands in Southeast Asia, separated by their predominant ethnic 
makeup: Annamese, Chinese and mixed.  The French even generated a map and index of 
‘pirate’ bands at the end of 1889 which was kept in brigade headquarters for quick 
reference.90  While these efforts are interesting, and in fact are the source of some of our 
earliest ethnographies, especially in Africa, French forces had their best luck when identifying 
rebel leaders with whom they could negotiate and potentially convince to submit to French 
rule in exchange for clemency, money, or other concessions. 
 Submission, the act of not only accepting the French presence but also of entering 
French dependence, was a highly codified practice in most parts of the French empire.  As a 
practice it was not wholly of French invention, but drew on existing customs for such 
arrangements wherever possible.  Many Arabic countries, for example, already had in place 
the concept of ‘amân’, meaning both to submit and demand peace.91  In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the ‘palaver’ operated along similar lines.92  The submission of a rebel leader generally turned 
him into a ‘supplier’ (‘soumissionnaire’) expected to assist French operations when called 
                                                
 
 
90 Le Prince, Étude militaire sur le Tonkin, op. cit. 
91 The term refers to both a pact of non-aggression between a winner and a loser; it is also in some cases a 
guarantee of safe-passage. « amân », in Sourdel, Janine et Dominique (2004) Dictionnaire historique de l’islam 
(Paris: PUF) p. 77 
92 After all the talking the palaver can also, conversely, be a harbinger of war. 
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upon.  Such arrangements, perhaps unsurprisingly, were fragile, and indeed fluid.  Defections 
and recantations were common; for many the act of submission was nothing more than buying 
time. In 1889, in Upper Tonkin, Doi-Van feigned submission to better observe the French and 
take their weapons before resuming the fight.93  Similarly, De Tham had ‘submitted’ and then 
defected on many occasions during his 20-year ‘reign’.94  
 Before long, the French began requiring a signed treaty with the ‘submitted’ to clarify 
the conditions of the submission.95  At times the forces of individual leaders (Luh-Vinh-Phuoc 
in 1885, Si-Votha in Cambodia in 1890) were wholesale integrated into French armed 
colonizers as unequal allies.  In Africa, negotiation with village chiefs was so important as to 
necessitate the writing of a specific manual to train officers in the art of African diplomacy 
(the Manuel des palabres ou l’art de tenir palabre).96  In many cases, war and peace hinged 
on these negotiations; things which most officers had not been formally prepared for before 
deployment.97  In some cases, submission could be had through the promise of a pension for 
rebel leaders (whether the leader shared the pension with their followers or not was left up to 
them).98  In Africa, the acceptance of ‘submitted’ or protectorate status involved a formal 
ritual of submission which included the exchange of food 99, the distribution of gifts in kind, 
or gold.100  Despite French self-perceptions as an increasingly legitimate authority, large parts 
                                                
 
 
93 Frey, Henry (1892) Pirates et rebelles au Tonkin. Nos soldats au Yen-Thé (Paris: Hachette) p. 31 
94 Lyautey, op. cit., letter  30 septembre 1895. 
95 See act of aman between colonel Gouraud and Mohamed el Fonana Ben M’hammed, head of the djemma of 
Torch in 1909. PA AP 399, C16-D1, January 1909, 19th. 
96 Angoulvant, Gabriel (1916) Le Manuel des palabres ou l’art de tenir palabre (Paris: éditeur inconnu) 
97 D’Andurain, Julie, « Négocier en Syrie en 1920 : Gouraud et Fayçal avant la bataille de Damas » in Vivet, 
Emmanuel (2014, ed.) Négociations d’hier, leçons pour aujourd’hui (Paris: Larcier) pp. 225-238 
98 The chiefs Luong-Tam-Ky and Baky, north of Thai-Nguyen, received a pension in 1893, but revolted once 
again in 1895 anyway.  
99 This might also include an exchange of dolo, a beer made out of millet. 
100 The submission of the Ashanti king Prepeh in 1896 entailed the payment of 50,000 ounces of gold.  
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of the empire remained only thinly influenced by the French, and were retained solely through 
means of petty bribery or empty threats. 
 
Coercion 
When these methods were not enough, French policy switched from one of conciliation to one 
of brutal repression.  Whilst in Tonkin, Lyautey wrote to his sister describing the 
‘establishment of a policy of complete liquidation [regarding] piracy of Tonkin’ between June 
and September 1895.101  Such conflicts escalated quickly and were often markedly brutal, 
with the French often resorting to the kidnapping and torturing suspected dissidents.102  In 
Tonkin in the late 1800s decapitation became a regular occurrence as the French sought to 
‘pacify’ the region.  In another one of his letters, Lyautey claimed that it was common to see 
heads dangling from trees.103  Such public performance of violence by the nascent authority, 
combined with the propaganda of systematically referring to rebels as ‘bandits’ and publicly 
displaying their severed heads was brutally effective at solidifying, if only temporarily, 
French control over their fledgling overseas empire.  The practice was found in all theatres all 
across the empire.104 
 In Africa, French forces relied heavily on staged ambushes, mimicking ancient 
                                                
 
 
101 Lyautey, op. cit., lettre du 30 septembre 1895 ; « La grande idée directrice de ces trois mois a été la mise sur 
pied d'un programme de liquidation totale de la piraterie du Tonkin » 
102 Commandant Verraux, « Monographie d’un chef pirate au Tonkin : le De-Tham », A travers le monde, juillet 
1898, p. 225-228. 
103 Lyautey, Hubert (1920) Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar (1894-1899), Tome 1 (Paris: Armand Colin), 
lettre du 29 avril 1895. 
104 Francis Garnier was decapitated by the Black Flags in 1873, Charles Gordon by Mahdists in the Sudan in 
1885; Mamadou Lamine decapitated his chief rival Omar Penda in April 1886; Mamadou’s son was executed in 
the same manner by order of Gallieni in April 1887.   
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patterns of warfare in the Sahel.105  Here too, the crushing of a rebellion frequently meant 
employing radical measures; decapitation was seen as matter of course.  The French often 
believed that the success of their campaigns relied on such brutality, but some serious study of 
these campaigns forces one to take a more nuanced approach.  An overabundance of force 
could not only engender prolonged, if temporarily latent, opposition, it could sometimes lead 
to real political scandals at home as well (Voulet-Chanoine’ scandal, in 1898-1899).106  
Military overreach and occasions of performative violence should not, however, lead us to 
assume that the military was the sole purveyor of such harsh measures.  Civilian 
administrators could be equally violent in repressing dissent, as was the case during the 
pacification of Ivory Coast between 1908 and 1915, led by Gabriel Angoulvant.107  Feeling 
that the ‘peaceful conquest’ or ‘commercial conquest’ were mistakes, he recommended the 
use of ‘the hard way’, with no outward displays of weakness or sentimentality.  The French 
experimentation with more coercive methods was broadly applied, and part of the now-
understood inherent violence and brutality of imperialism.  
 
Conclusion 
The period of France’s most intense colonial expansion (1880-1914) saw French armed forces 
thrust into situations that they had not widely experienced before.  They did not have a 
suitable language for the sorts of opponents they faced, nor for their new-found operational 
                                                
 
 
105 Colonel Péroz, « La Tactique dans le Soudan - Première partie quelques combats et épisodes de guerre 
remarquables », Revue maritime et coloniale, 1890, p. 79-129.  
106 Mathieu, Muriel (1995) La Mission Afrique Centrale (Paris: l’Harmattan) 
107 Angoulvant, Gabriel (1916) La Pacification de la Côte d’Ivoire (1908-1915) (Paris: Larose) 
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and administrative responsibilities.  This confusion, and lack of pre-existing models and 
experience on which to reflect, led both to conflicting conceptualisations of who they (the 
French) were, what they were doing, and to the changing military procedures that came in 
response to political challenges.  These changes and contradictions are to be found in both the 
official correspondence and bureaucratic detritus left to us in archives, as well as the many 
works of ‘colonial military literature’ that survive in the forms of non-fiction books and 
pamphlets written for broader consumption.  The proximity of official conceptualisations of 
events and the more private recollections thereof should leave us feeling confident in our 
assessment of how the French understood military challenges to their imperial domination of 
Africa and Southeast Asia.  These conceptions are important for understanding how and why 
the French acted the way they did in this period of ‘pacification’.  
 As the nascent control of the French extended into the Asian and African interior and 
solidified its control over pre-existing Asian and African power structures the French began to 
see themselves in a different light.  The mission civilisatrice (and its counterparts of 
‘economic development’ and ‘material progress’) remained, but the duty to bring ‘order’ and 
‘security’ grew, leading to increasingly harsh measures taken against the remaining 
‘insoumis’: those not (yet) submitted.  With no sense of irony whatsoever French officers and 
administrators depicted themselves as the saviours of indigenous societies whilst calling for, 
or carrying out, brutal acts of repression against anticolonial rebels.  A cross examination of 
the literature they left behind, and their official correspondence and documentation, helps to 
better elucidate this complexity giving us a better understanding of the impact and experience 




Page 27 of 61
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/french


































































Page 28 of 61
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/french




































































Pirates, Slavers, Brigands, and Gangs: the French 
terminology of anticolonial rebellion (1880-1920) 
 
 
After missionaries, soldiers were often the first Frenchmen to enter the African and Southeast 
Asian interior.  These soldiers (men and officers) at the forefront of French colonial conquest 
left behind extensive source material, which gives us a unique perspective into both the 
actions and mind-set of French colonisers in the late 1800s and early 1900s.  They not only 
wrote official reports1, they maintained correspondence with their friends and relatives2, 
developed stories3, propaganda texts4, and sometimes published novels based on their 
experience5.  On occasion they acted as journalists, often with support from the directors, 
publicists, and politicians of the parti colonial in Paris: those military and government men 
who advocated for a vast French overseas empire.6  Taken in its broadest sense, the literature 
produced during the most intensive period of colonial conquest (1880-1914) forms today a 
considerable mass of documents.  In the form of primary sources, secondary sources or ‘grey 
literature’7 we can think of these sources as together constituting a ‘colonial military 
literature’.8   
 This literature is a valuable and under-utilised resource in determining how the French 
understood the socio-political and military contexts they were operating in.  Read critically, 
and in context, an examination of this literature gives us a unique perspective into the ‘French 
colonial mind’ as laid out by Martin Thomas in his two-volume edited collection of essays on 
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the subject (The French Colonial Mind, volumes 1 and 2).  Thomas’ edited collection 
provides readers with a wide-ranging and stimulating series of snapshots which, taken 
together, give readers an excellent sense of both the diverse spectrum of colonial thought and 
action, whilst also offering up a few universal threads which tie together a large and diverse 
group of individuals and their experiences.  Due to the nature of such a scholarly undertaking, 
however, the books are not often able to provide a continuing account of the changing 
narratives, the evolving identification and self-identification, that wrought the French colonial 
mind as the French empire expanded and solidified.  In particular, this is true of the changing 
character of armed conflict between the French and local populations in Africa and Southeast 
Asia as initial conquests turned into enduring policing operations with a wide variety of 
political, social and military challenges.  This article will examine some of the diverse sources 
that French officers left behind and analyse the evolving understanding French military 
personnel had of the anticolonial movements they were called on to police and supress. 
 
 The military men who undertook the initial conquest and ‘pacification’ of the French 
overseas empire quickly came into contact with resistance, often violent, to the nascent 
control they had established.  When writing about resistance these men generally did not refer 
to rebels as the ‘social bandit’ described by Eric Hobsbawm some 60 years ago.9  This is not 
to say that the French did not have a varied and nuanced language to describe the regular 
uprisings they found themselves facing.  Indeed, French officers and administrators deployed 
a range of terms to describe anticolonial rebels that belie geography, time period, French 
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perceptions of individual movements, as well as their own self-perception as colonisers.  
Frequently, the language French officers deployed when discussing anticolonial uprisings 
served to denigrate them and their participants, much in the same way that British imperial 
officers and agents did.  Ranajit Guha’s study of this phenomenon in the Raj (the referring to 
Muslim protestors and rebels as ‘fanatics’, etc.) provides a worthy and apt counterpart to 
broader European imperial frameworks and conceptions.10  
 French officers often chose their terminology self-consciously to frame situations to 
their superiors in the colonial capitals like Dakar and Hanoi, or indeed in Paris, in such a way 
as to either bolster or shield the reputation of the officer in question.  Language could either 
inflate or downplay the actual importance of a given movement in order to prod higher 
authorities to respond, or at least to deflect their own possible responsibility for things getting 
out of hand.  The internal and external political context in which French officers wrote about 
anticolonial rebellion was paramount. 
 The French military in this period expressed the idea of ‘rebellion’ in many different 
ways, varying in both time and space.  French military personnel saw their opponents not 
quite as ‘the enemy’ (in the strict military sense), often as a ‘brigand’ or ‘bandit’, rarely as a 
legitimate soldier, and at least in this period, not yet as a nationalist.  In Southeast Asia French 
officers tended to refer to rebels as ‘pirates’, reflecting the actual existence of powerful pirate 
and other outlaw groups in the region in the 1800s.11  In African colonial literature there was 
generally no talk of ‘piracy’, but instead of ‘bandits’12, ‘slave-chiefs’ or ‘mahdistes’.13  
Similar terminology, arising out of similar political and military pressures, was also prevalent 
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in British India, among other European overseas colonies.14  Over time, however, in part 
because of the proliferation of anticolonial rebellions and also due to the transference of 
colonial officers between different theatres of operation, the terminology surrounding 
anticolonial rebellions began to change.  This evolution of terminology, to some extent 
representative of the growing unification and solidification of French, and wider European, 
concepts of imperialism and anticolonialism, gives us insight into how the French saw 
themselves, their objectives, their local collaborators and dissenters within the colonial 
context.  How the French chose to write and talk about anticolonial rebellion was itself a 
critical part of their attempt to achieve dominion over large swaths of the global south.  They 
actively sought to improve their ability to fight against anticolonial, and later nationalist, 
movements both in military terms, but also through their speech. 
 
I 
In the nineteenth century, the French use of the word ‘rebel’ designated something of an 
instigator; one who must be compelled to obedience.  By definition, the rebel is one who 
challenges a ruling power.  If political opposition exists within a legal framework, the case 
becomes one of ‘disobedience’.  If an individual resists political authority, does not obey, and 
violates socio-cultural rules or traditions, they became a ‘dissident’, and so forth.  Such 
naming conventions can take many forms, and should be instantly recognizable as part of the 
basic political framework between the ‘rebel’ and the ‘establishment’.  As Stathis Kalyvas put 
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it in his 2006 book The Logic of Violence in Civil War: ‘incumbents…label their opponents 
“bad guys”, bandits, criminals, subversives, or terrorists – and describe the war as banditry, 
terrorism, delinquent subversion, and other cognate terms’.15  Kalyvas counts anticolonial 
wars as civil wars, and does so for good reason: typically members of the local ethnic 
populations do the vast bulk of the fighting and dying, with allegiances very often falling 
along pre-colonial lines, or other factors that have little or nothing to do with the presence of 
an outside power.16 
 In the French colonial context of the late 19th and early 20th centuries organised 
anticolonial violence could be emblematic of a broader popular resistance that might lead to a 
full-blown insurrection, or it may constitute merely the armed resistance of scattered gangs 
without any real political objectives beyond survival.  The French generally distinguished 
between these different types of resistance by referring to them as either ‘political’ or 
‘apolitical’, albeit often without solid evidence for their classifications.17  This classification 
could be used to make movements seem more or less threatening, as the reporter may desire, 
and also had ramifications for what could be done to captured dissidents.  There were at times 
hotly contested debates over whether actions were ‘political’ or not in court, and also whether 
or not Metropolitan law applied to colonial subjects.18   
 The prevailing terminology for referring to ‘rebels’ or ‘rebellion’ often related to 
historical or geographic markers that make the varied regions under French influence different 
from each other.  In Asia French terminology was influenced by the British definitions given 
to the gunmen of India and Burma, the dacoit19; dacoïtisme having prospered amid weak 
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Brahman institutions. 20  The French used this term second-hand from the British, who 
themselves took it from Indian usage.  French officers occasionally used English loan words 
(‘gang’, for example) in a colonial context for ‘colour’ and variety.  Words like dacoit had the 
added appeal of exoticism, which helped spur its adoption by French officers.  In Indochina 
‘bandits’ spread through the support of mandarins hostile to France, many of them supported 
discretely by China, in a perennial anarchic system which the French chose to call ‘piracy’.21  
These small armed bands might at times be simple outlaws, or they might be proto-nationalist 
fighters, or, more likely, they might drift between the two depending on circumstance.  The 
participation of ‘bandits’ in revolutionary movements was not new to the region, such groups 
played a critical role in the Tay Son rebellion in the late 18th century, but the French had 
difficulty understanding their complex role in Southeast Asian, especially Vietnamese, 
society.22 
 Interestingly, the term ‘pirate’ was not only used by Europeans in Southeast Asia.  It 
was also used by some Vietnamese leaders who refused to accept the French occupation, as 
evidenced by the papers of Ngé-Dinh, an Annamite chieftain in the region of Than-Hoa and 
Nge-An between 1886 and 1887.23  In his text, he wrote that local people considered the 
French to be pirates for the way they had subjugated and exploited Indochina.  Unfortunately, 
we do not have the original text, and so do not know what Vietnamese word was used for 
‘pirate’.  Terminology that might be translated at ‘bandit’ or ‘pirate’, however, is not 
uncommon in Southeast Asia.  In his recent book Imperial Bandits Bradley Camp Davis 
translates the Vietnamese word giac for ‘bandit’, specifically in reference to the Black Flags, 
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a prominent ‘bandit’ or ‘outlaw’ group of the late 19th century.24  It is possible that Ngé-Dinh 
had used this, or an analogous, word.  Similar language (‘banditry’ or ‘piracy’) is repeated by 
other Vietnamese individuals at different times to describe French activity in Southeast Asia.  
The concept of French piracy played a prominent role in the decrees released by rebels in 
Thai-Nguyen in 1917, for example; one of the first uprisings in Indochina to position itself in 
clearly nationalist terms.25  In addition to the terms ‘rebel’ and ‘pirate’, ‘band’ or ‘gang’ was 
frequently used, and became synonymous with irregular forces, sometimes even with local 
militias.  All this reflects the emergence of an unknown war, irregular warfare, but also of 
French efforts to control, or at least influence, the political messaging of internal dissent.26  
 
II 
Why did the French not simply refer to rebels as ‘the enemy’, the way they would have 
referred to most military opponents?  Largely, this was due to the delicate political 
circumstances in which the French armed forces were operating. To label rebel forces as ‘the 
enemy’ implies certain political preconditions, and strongly suggests the legitimacy of their 
movement (this is the point Kalyvas made in The Logic of Violence in Civil War).  From a 
purely military perspective, talking about ‘the enemy’ also suggests, and perhaps opens the 
door to more conventional forms of warfare.27  The term ‘enemy’ could furthermore be 
politically inflexible.  This could be a serious hindrance in the fluid strategic environment the 
French found themselves in, in which today’s enemies may need to be accommodated with 
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tomorrow (the granting of a small, semi-independent fiefdom to the proto-nationalist fighter  
De Tham is a case in point).  Keenly aware of the disadvantages that would come with 
legitimizing their opponents, French officers tended to shy away from strictly military 
language, and instead adopted the more vague terminology of policing and security. 
 During the conquest of the bulk of their colonial empire, the French had no official 
declared enemy.  They instead faced a complicated, messy situation that included everything 
from massacres, and robbery, to simple brigandage and even full-blown insurrection.  The 
concept of a rebel (pirate, bandit, etc.) was often used as a euphemism for any opponent 
operating within a non-state framework.  In the colonial context terminology, and at times 
strategy, frequently confused ‘war’ with ‘security’ and ‘policing’.  Indeed, the French, both 
civilian and military, often referred to their own military operations as ‘police actions’ when 
fighting against anticolonial forces, rather than ‘military operations’, a term usually reserved 
for more remote geographies, or more extreme levels of opposition (such as in Niger and 
Chad in the early 20th century).28  These ‘police actions’ or punitive raids did not typically fit 
the traditional ‘Clausewitzian’ model.  Instead they took the form of what was at the time 
referred to as ‘small war’29, that is to say, the war of ambush and surprise which began to be 
codified in the mid-nineteenth century by writers like Charles Callwell and Albert Ditte.  This 
attempted reconciliation of accepted ‘European’ warfare with the violence and military 
operations common in the colonies helped ensure that terms reserved for conventional 
European wars were not often used for anticolonial uprisings, thus necessitating the invention 
and use of innovative terminology.30  
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The transition from what European observers considered to be simple brigandage to rebellion 
was often expressed by use of the word ‘surpris’ (uprising) by French officers; a word that 
strongly implied a certain magnitude of opposition. 31  It was a much stronger word than the 
ubiquitous ‘troubles’, which typically included riots, bombings, skirmishes and assassination.  
The uprising in Than Hoa, in northern Tonkin, in 1886 or that of the Bambara and Fulani in 
Segou in 1892, for example, were sufficiently large to outstrip the term ‘troubles’ and grow 
into full-blown ‘uprisings’ in French parlance.32 This more serious level of discontent 
(‘uprising’) was considered especially dangerous if it was backed by a religious movement, 
especially one associated with Islam.33   
 French officers soon came to believe that they were accurately distinguishing between 
the pirate, the rebel, the band, the ‘gang’ and full-blown rebellious armies.  The generally 
poor level of knowledge French officers had of their colonial subjects however, let alone the 
inner workings and motivations of secretive organisations and conspiracies, means that 
French designations need to be treated with caution.34  In general, groups were first identified 
by their leader (for example, Doi-Van and De Tham in the Yen-Thé region in Tonkin; Lat-
Dior, Behanzin, Samory, and Ahmadou were similarly classified in Africa). The French often 
knew the rough location of these groups, except in cases where the rebels were mobile or 
nomadic, but at times knew little more than that.  In the absence of clear intelligence, the 
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identification of the leader at times acted as a shortcut to describing not just the socio-political 
motives of a given anticolonial group, but also their assumed tactics.35   
 To an extent, the sheer size of a rebellious or outlaw group imbued it with a certain 
meaning for French officers.  Larger groups were more dangerous, and far more often to be 
considered rebellious, if not revolutionary.  Of course, given spotty French intelligence, 
estimates on rebel troop numbers could vary wildly, and with it the interpretations of given 
groups, and thus the terminology applied to them.  This did not stop the French from 
deploying troops and undertaking operations based on speculation and rumour.  In Asia, the 
French rarely had good intelligence on the number of Black Flags there were, but nevertheless 
considered it necessary to mobilize at least 20,000 to 30,000 men against them between 1883-
1886 (admittedly within the context of the Sino-French War).36  For comparison, the Siamese 
army was estimated to be only 5,000 men in 1893; the French deployment was truly 
massive.37  In Africa estimates also varied wildly.  French officers believed that Ahmadou, 
‘the Jugurtha of Sudan’, was able to muster 10,000 warriors against Archinard in December 
1890.38  While this is unlikely, it must be said that such large forces were not unknown to the 
region.  The Abyssinians were able bring 30,000 men against the Italians; the Dahomey army 
has nearly 22,000 men; and the Malagasy maintained a force of 25,000 to 30,000 warriors. 39  
Samory force numbers were roughly the same (between 20,000 and 30,000).40   These were 
real armies with regular, regimented soldiers, and as such their members were often given 
specific designations: the ‘Amazons’ of Behanzin in Dahomey41, the ‘talibés’ of Ahmadou, 
the ‘sofas’ of Samory.42  Thus, terminology was deployed not only to describe the supposed 
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size and intentions of a given local force, it was also a way of implying the strength and 
rationale of the bonds that tied these forces together.  The term ‘talibés’ (‘Islamic students’) is 
especially interesting here, as it implied not only a sort of mentoring, devotional attachment to 
Ahmadou, but also a religious fanaticism tinged with cultish leanings.  This played directly to 
long-standing French fears about Islam and its practitioners.43  Using a loan word originally 
from Arabic (talib, the same basis for the term ‘Taliban’) had the added appeal of exoticism, 
thus fixing Ahmadou’s followers into a certain French conception about the Muslim world. 
 French officers did not just apply terminology to rebel forces and their participants, 
but also to the differing geographies in which rebellious movements most frequently 
occurred.  These geographies ultimately carried with them conceptual, cultural and political 
baggage in the same way ‘the bush’, or other similar terms did.  To some extent, this is due to 
certain geographic similarities which manifest across different colonies, or even different 
continents.  Mountainous areas almost always offered refuge for individuals trying to escape 
central authority, be it in Indochina or southern Algeria.44  Not every jurisdiction was 
conducive to the development of rebellion.  Proximity to French administrative and military 
power generally precluded the organisation of large-scale violent resistance.  Uprisings most 
often erupted in more remote and rugged regions where groups could operate with relative 
impunity.  Lyautey, for example, remarked that ‘the pirate is a plant that grows only in certain 
lands’.45  Writing about more contemporary conflicts Laurent Henninger has referred to these 
different geographies as the ‘fluid’ and the ‘solid’, showing the longue durée impact that 
simple geography has on strategy and politics.46     
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 Geography necessarily had an impact on how the French understood, and referred to, 
anticolonial movements.  Thus, we find French officers and administrators more likely to 
refer to ‘pirates’ in the Asian littoral, and ‘rebels’ being referred to by the army fighting in the 
African interior.  There were also distinctions made between pacified and war torn territories, 
which were usually called ‘military territories’ and administered directly by the French armed 
forces. This division between civilian and militarily governed areas was one determined by 
the French, but it was not entirely inconsistent with pre-existing realities. In the Arab world, 
for example, especially in Morocco, there was a similar distinction between the bled es-
Maghzen, land under the authority of the Sultan, and the bled es-siba, areas of only tenuous 
influence and control.47 
 In Southeast Asia geographic categorization and terminology was applied with 
pseudo-scientific precision, in part because it delineated where Europeans could and could not 
(or, at least, ‘should’ not) focus their agricultural reforms and exploitation.48  Across the 
French overseas empire land that was not being cultivated to French satisfaction was 
considered fair game for expropriation and cultivation under French ownership.49  This 
applied even to lands clearly under the command of local leaders, like the Toucouleur empire 
in West Africa.  Many of these states were (conveniently) considered decadent by the French, 
which in French eyes rendered their territories res nullius50 or ‘nobody’s property’: thus, free 
to occupy by Europeans.51  This led to the somewhat absurd development of Joseph Gallieni 
speaking of African leaders as ‘rebels’ to the French authority, even in instances when France 
was invading their land.52  This evolution marked a notable change in how the French saw 
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their actions in Africa and Southeast Asia.  From the 1880s onwards any opposition to French 
rule, or even French expansion, was typically seen as ‘rebellious’, even when the French had 
no legitimate claim to the land or peoples in question.  This implied sense of ‘manifest 
destiny’ belied the growing French belief in their authority not only to conquer, but also to 
govern.  This development can be seen in how French officials began to deal with, and talk 
about, rebellious groups in Southeast Asia and Africa. 
 
IV 
 The fighting in Tonkin took on a character that belied simple classification, and sat 
outside the prevailing French discourse surrounding anticolonial rebellion, despite attempts to 
classify fighting in Tonkin from as early as 1885.53  The French experience of fighting in 
Tonkin centred around the discovery and destruction of ‘rebel dens’ (the ‘den’ of Tong-Hoa 
Phu was destroyed in November 1894, and that of Phiama in December 1894 by Théophile 
Pennequin, for example).54  Following the destruction of each ‘den’ the French erected their 
own outpost in the region to assert their control and influence over the area.55  Thus, the 
conquest of each ‘den’ brought an increased permanence to the French occupation of the 
region; the construction of new fortresses made French domination a physical reality.     
 Of the different regions of Tonkin that the French slowly attempted to bring under 
their rule Yen-Thé is probably the most famous.  Yen-Thé had an ideal geography in which to 
base a rebellious or insurrectional movement.  Upper Tonkin is a mountainous area, filled 
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with dense forest; a difficult ‘Swiss Tonkinese’.56  The area lent itself to the construction of 
complex fortifications, which the French could not easily break without massing substantial 
firepower.57  Such an organisational effort generally was sufficient to tip off an impending 
attack, giving De Tham and his band of ‘pirates’ ample time to flee into the densely wooded 
mountains, or slip over the border into a neighbouring province.  Similar areas, be they 
jungle, mountain or desert, existed across the French empire and were generally far beyond 
the reach of meaningful European control.  Such terrain had a magnetic quality that drew a 
wide range of dissidents to it, strengthening existing rebel/outlaw bands.58  For both French 
and British colonial officers these spaces were understood and referred to as the 
‘hinterland’.59   
 On occasions when the French were able to locate and penetrate a ‘rebel den’, they 
were consistently impressed by the ‘pirate’ defence systems they employed; their organization 
was often markedly better than fortifications built by the French.60  Dens were generally in the 
middle of a dense forest hidden by underbrush with camouflaged firing positions producing 
overlapping fields of fire protecting the den’s few exits and entrances.61  Alongside such 
defences rebels and outlaws in Southeast Asia made use of an array of field defences which 
would go on to develop lasting notoriety during the American War in Vietnam: ‘punji sticks’ 
(shallow excavations lined with sharp stakes), fences and bamboo stakes often masked their 
fortified hideouts. 
 Even if the French could locate and clear out a ‘rebel den’, that was often not enough.  
The ‘pirates’ often escaped French efforts to capture them and break up their ring.  They were 
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aided in this by the seasonal nature of the struggle, with wet seasons limiting the size and 
duration of French operations.  Weather often made the remote, mountainous regions 
unnavigable for French forces, and even in good weather the French could not always scrape 
together the funds necessary to create and sustain a column in the field for long enough to 
track down rebel bands.62  In an attempt to get around these substantial operational difficulties 
the French relied heavily on what little intelligence they could gather.  When good 
intelligence came in it was necessary to act quickly, which spurred the rapid installation of 
optical telegraphy in Indochina to facilitate rapid communication from military post to 
military post.63  This gave the French an advantage, but it also meant that the telegraph wires 
were an obvious and frequent target for anticolonial rebels.64   
 As French influence and infrastructure began to spread the French began to use the 
language of policing and inherent authority in Southeast Asia.  Regarding one attempt to 
capture De Tham in 1909 the French resident of Tonkin released a public decree stating that: 
 
‘The French Government has granted Hoàng-hoa-Tham [De Tham] for some years [an offer] 
to submit, on the condition that he would in future be an honest man.  Since this time this 
pirate chief has constantly failed to keep his word.  His concession [De Tham had been 
granted a small fiefdom by the French in return for keeping his brigandage under control] has 
become the refuge of poisoners, thieves, assassins and brigands.  The Government, of which 
all the honest population knows its sentiments, tired of the odious conduct of this bandit chief 
has decided: [in order] to support the working population, and assure them tranquillity, to put 
an end to the current situation in Yen-Thé and place the region under the common rule…. The 
Government is firmly resolved to go to the end.  All is ready.  [The Government] will 
compensate all those who help it.  Deliver up De Tham, who has violated all laws.’65 
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By the early 1900s the French were no longer an invading (as opposed to an ‘occupying’) 
force in Southeast Asia, or there under thin pretences to help the Nguyen Dynasty’s legitimate 
government.  Instead, they had become the government, and spoke as such; a major marker in 
French colonial supremacy in the region.  At this time the French began more and more to 
refer to rebels as ‘insoumis’: those who have not (yet) submitted.66  Such language not only 
positioned the French as the legitimate authority, but also assumed the inevitability of their 
colonial dominance (itself a term that French officers used self-consciously).67  It is worth 
noting that the 1909 attack on De Tham’s principal fortress came in the wake of a 1908 
attempted mass poisoning of Europeans at a dinner in Hanoi. 68  The poisoning was to be 
followed up by an assault on Hanoi itself led by De Tham and his allies.  As Michael Vann 
has pointed out, attacks on Europeans in Asia and Africa, be they coordinated military 
assaults, individual attacks or simple signs of insubordination, were seen as an attack on the 
very foundations of colonialism.69  Even minor acts of subversion were not only considered a 
real threat to the colonial order, they also justified brutal retribution on the part of the colonial 
authority.  This sentiment, and the power to act on it, grew as colonial power and authority 
solidified both intellectually and physically in the early 1900s. 
 
V 
 Similar patterns existed in Africa, with the French changing their terminology as they 
faced resistance to their imperial ambitions in the African interior.  The enduring popular 
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image of this period remains one of vast numbers of brave, but poorly armed, African 
warriors throwing themselves hopelessly against the full weight of modern firepower brought 
to bear by Europeans and their local allies.  In reality, however, the French very quickly found 
themselves fighting against forces that relied heavily on firearms, and even modern, quick-
firing rifles. This is certainly the case in Dahomey with Behanzin70, Ahmadou near Segou on 
the Niger71, Samory in French Sudan72, as well as with Rabih az-Zubayr ibn Fadl Allah and 
al-Zubayr between the basins of the Nile and the Ubangi.73  Modern firepower became even 
more accessible to African warriors during and after the First World War.  This was in part 
due to Turco-German efforts to stoke anticolonial unrest in French and British colonies, but 
also the ample opportunities for capturing, stealing or being given European weapons that 
were sent to Africa during the conflict.74   
 Perhaps the most stunning example of anticolonial rebels wielding modern firearms in 
Africa comes from the Kaocen War in Niger, 1916-17 (although fighting continued until 
1920).75  The conflict began in December 1916 when a mixture of Arab, Toubou and Tuareg 
warriors appeared outside the walls of Agadez in central Niger armed with modern Italian 
rifles, a machinegun and even an 70mm Italian artillery piece, with ammunition.76  The 
warriors themselves were no strangers to modern warfare, and included men who had seen 
action in Algeria at Djanet against the French, as well as Italian askari who had deserted in 
Fez and Tripolitania.77  Such experienced and well-armed opponents were not uncommon in 
French Africa.  In fact, it was common for French soldiers and administrators to refer to 
nomadic raiding parties (rezzous or harkas) by the number of rifles they had rather than their 
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total number of participants, the same way European forces were frequently counted in the 
same period.78  The adoption or co-option of Arabic words (rezzou or razzia) served to 
typecast opponents to French colonialism, implied their objectives and methodology for them, 
and also freed the French up to pursue their own invented interpretations of what they thought 
‘local’ warfare meant.79   
 By shielding themselves behind misinterpretations of African warfare French officers, 
who often referred back to ancient Sahelian war-fighting methods in their writing, tried to 
justify their brutal punitive columns and the wanton violence they committed. 80  Terminology 
here was a potent shield against the political, moral and social consequences of their actions.  
It was not a perfect defence.  The well-known barbarity of the Voulet-Chanoine column tried, 
and failed, to hide behind preconceptions of African brutality.  For many other cases, 
however, such conceptions and terminologies were sufficient to provide cover for a broad 
range of atrocities and military overreach.  This was partially the case during the Kaocen War.  
After the initial operations to lift the siege at Agadez French troops, some of whom had 
travelled from as far away as Dakar, engaged in a brutal campaign of repression and 
retribution.  The Aïr region, already wracked by the famine of 1912-1915, lost roughly half of 
its population due to the war.81  British onlookers were shocked, stating that the French 
repression in Niger ‘appeared to be little short of extermination’.82 
 Throughout the French empire the crushing of a rebellion frequently meant employing 
radical measures; decapitation and other gruesome displays were seen as matter of course.83  
While this violence was not ‘terminology’ as such, it still constituted a form of 
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communication.  Many French officers believed that the success of their campaigns relied on 
such brutality, even if their results did not always bear this out.  An overabundance of force 
could not only engender prolonged, if temporarily latent, opposition, it could sometimes lead 
to real political scandals at home.84  Military overreach and occasions of performative 
violence should not, however, lead us to assume that the military was the sole purveyor of 
such harsh measures.  Civilian administrators could be equally violent in repressing dissent, 
as was the case during the pacification of Ivory Coast between 1908 and 1915, led by Gabriel 
Angoulvant.85  Feeling that the ‘peaceful conquest’ or ‘commercial conquest’ had been 
strategic mistakes, he recommended the use of ‘the hard way’, with no outward displays of 
weakness or sentimentality.  The French experimentation with more coercive methods was 




Militarily insurrections were often countered in the brutal way that Angoulvant and others 
advocated: by use of the column, the punitive raid.  Beyond purely military responses, 
however, there were administrative and organisational practic s that were intended to contain 
any possible insurrection.  These can tell us a fair bit about the French colonial mind.  Areas 
that were only recently conquered or not yet pacified, for example, were often designated 
‘military areas’.  This principle was applied in Tonkin in April 1891 with the creation of four 
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military territories, which were seen as borders delineating separate war zones. 86  They were 
commanded by lieutenant-colonels or colonels who had the powers of a general, and thus 
acted as true autocrats in their territories.  Designated military territories were further divided 
into different sectors with designated intelligence units.  Within these spheres of influence 
individual officers often undertook various natural and ethnographic studies to try to learn 
more about the regions that France had so recently conquered. 87  Combined, these 
overlapping spaces were intended to limit the spread of any insurrection, and contain them 
long enough to be met with a suitable repression.  By 1895, the term ‘tache d’huile’ was 
being used to describe this ‘progressive’ methodology, generally associated with Joseph 
Gallieni.88  The theory was substantially furthered in Madagascar by Captain Frederic Hellot 
in 1899. 89 
 The practice of setting up ‘military areas’ nominally had its intellectual roots in classic 
studies of Roman Africa. 90  This echo of the classical world was brought back through the 
intellectual efforts of Frenchmen like Jean-Louis de Lanessan (civil-military governor of 
Indochina, 1891-1894) in his Principes de colonisation, published in 1897.91  This look back 
to antiquity gives us an interesting glimpse into how at least some French officers saw 
themselves and their actions.  On the one hand, many were clearly amateur historians, 
classicists, botanists, and ethnographers who wrote about their different subject matters for a 
mixture of personal interest and possible strategic or economic benefit. 92  On the other hand, 
pseudo-intellectualism often provided a veneer of respectability which might serve to justify, 
or at least try to contextualise, barbarous acts of repression.  The studies of Octave Depont, 
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who compiled substantial reports on Islam in Africa and also the anticolonial uprisings in 
Algeria in 1916, are rife with this sort of misappropriated Classical imagery.  In Depont’s 
report on the Batna uprising references to liberty, progress, the benefits of French colonialism, 
and reflections on Carthage and the Numidians sit alongside calls for swift and brutal 
repression freed from the ‘scruples of legality’ that he felt typically hindered French efforts in 
their fight against anticolonialism.93 
 The mixture of romantic associations with the Classical world and contemporary 
severity and xenophobia expressed in Depont’s work appear frequently in the written and oral 
records left behind by French officers and civilians living in the colonies, giving us an 
interesting glimpse into how they saw themselves and colonized people.  In court proceedings 
from 1916, part of the aftermath from a failed attack on Saigon Central Prison, the Prosecutor 
General in Saigon, G. Michel, stated that ‘the French, successors of the Greeks and Romans, 
always had, in their duties as colonizers, a high and great design.  [T]hey never failed to push 
back against the exploitation of [non-white] races under their tutelage; the American theories 
of Captain [Alfred Thayer] Mahan of 'the incompetence of [non-white] races' will never find 
echo in French hearts.’94  Given what he felt had been the high-minded ideals of the French in 
their civilising mission Michel recommended that those accused of taking part in the attack 
receive the sternest punishment possible, essentially for their ingratitude and impudence.   
 While most of the frameworks, judgements and studies of African and Asian people 
were largely a simple matter of ex post facto justification for French imperialism, some of the 
better ethnographies were produced by individuals who genuinely see themselves as working 
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toward the betterment of African and Asian people.  Such self-conceptions could have 
tangible effects on how individuals chose to operate in their overseas duties.  Some colonial 
officers and administrators opted for relatively more lenient or accommodative measures.  
Others, like Depont and Michel, felt that any betrayal of French largesse should be met with 
the harshest response possible.  Their sense of affront underscores their belief in an 
established French colonial authority.  As such their calls for retributive violence were 
intellectually distinct from that of earlier phases of conquest which resorted to brutality under 
pretences of practicality.  Between June and September 1895, for example, Lyautey wrote to 
his sister describing the ‘establishment of a policy of complete liquidation [regarding] piracy 
of Tonkin’.95  Such conflicts escalated quickly and were often markedly brutal, with the 
French often resorting to the kidnapping and torturing of suspected dissidents.96  In Tonkin in 
the late 1800s decapitation became a regular occurrence as the French sought to ‘pacify’ the 
region.  In another one of his letters, Lyautey claimed that it was common to see heads 
dangling from trees.97  Public performance of violence by the nascent authority, combined 
with the propaganda of systematically referring to rebels as ‘bandits’ and publicly displaying 
their severed heads was brutally effective at solidifying, if only temporarily, French control 
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The period of France’s most intense colonial expansion (1880-1914) saw French armed forces 
thrust into situations that they had not widely experienced before.  They did not have a 
suitable language for the sorts of opponents they faced, nor for their new-found operational 
and administrative responsibilities.  This confusion, and lack of pre-existing models and 
experience on which to reflect, led to conflicting conceptualisations of who they (the French) 
were, what they were doing, and to the changing military procedures that came in response to 
political challenges.  These changes and contradictions are to be found in both the official 
correspondence and bureaucratic detritus left to us in archives, as well as the many works of 
colonial military literature that survive in the forms of non-fiction books and pamphlets 
written for broader consumption.  These conceptions are important for understanding how and 
why the French acted the way they did in this period of conquest and ‘pacification’.  
 As the nascent control of the French extended into the Asian and African interior and 
solidified its control over pre-existing Asian and African power structures the French began to 
see themselves in a different light.  The mission civilisatrice (and its counterpart, the mise en 
valeur) remained, but the duty to bring ‘order’ and ‘security’ grew, leading to increasingly 
harsh measures taken against the remaining ‘insoumis’: those not (yet) submitted.  With no 
sense of irony whatsoever French officers and administrators depicted themselves as the 
saviours of indigenous societies whilst calling for, or carrying out, brutal acts of repression 
against anticolonial rebels.  A cross examination of the literature they left behind, and their 
official correspondence and documentation, helps to better elucidate this complexity giving us 
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a better understanding of the impact and experience of French colonialism in the late 1800s 
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90 G. Boissier, L’Afrique romaine, promenades archéologiques en Algérie et Tunisie (Paris, 1895) 
91 J-L. Lanessan (de), Principes de colonisation (Paris, 1897) 
92 For example, Capitaine du Crosson, L’ethnographie de la Côte d’Ivoire (Paris, 1901) & Commandant Lunet 
de la Jonquières, Ethnographie des territoires militaires (Hanoï, 1904), publié ensuite sous le titre Ethnographie 
du Tonkin septentrional (Paris,1906) 
93 ANOM, ALG CONST B3 219; « Les Troubles Insurrectionn ls de l’Arrondissement de Batna en 1916 », 4-9 
94 ANOM, FM, nf, carton 8, dossier 28 (1); « Affaire dite le ‘Complot de Saigon-Cholon’, Cour Criminelle de 
Saigon du 5 au 13 Novembre 1913, Réquisitoire de M. le Procureur Général G. Michel » ; « Les Français, 
continuateurs des Grecs et des Romains, eurent toujours, de leurs devoirs de colonisateurs, une conception 
haute et grande, ils ne manquèrent jamais de repousser le concert de l’exploitation des races en tutelle ; et la 
théorie américain du Capitaine Mahan sur ‘l’incompétence des races’ ne trouvera jamais d’écho dans les cœurs 
français. » 
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95 Lyautey, op. cit., lettre du 30 septembre 1895 ; « La grande idée directrice de ces trois mois a été la mise sur 
pied d'un programme de liquidation totale de la piraterie du Tonkin » 
96 Commandant Verraux, ‘Monographie d’un chef pirate au Tonkin: le De-Tham’, A travers le monde, (1898),  
225-228 
97 H. Lyautey, Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar (1894-1899), Tome 1 (Paris, 1920), lettre du 29 avril 1895. 
98 Francis Garnier was decapitated by the Black Flags in 1873, Charles Gordon by Mahdists in the Sudan in 
1885; Mamadou Lamine decapitated his chief rival Omar Penda in April 1886; Mamadou’s son was executed in 
the same manner by order of Gallieni in April 1887.   
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